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Younger: Marriage, Divorce, and the Family: A Cautionary Tale

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE FAMILY:
A CAUTIONARY TALE
Judith T. Younger*

The modem American marriage, divorce, and family look very
different from those of twenty-five years ago.' So does the law governing them. I trace my first inkling of impending change to 1966
when I met Sidney and Walter Siben, in whose honor this speech is
given. Their firm, Siben & Siben, was substituted into a matrimonial
action in which my firm was representing the defendant-husband. The
Sibens came into the case for the plaintiff-wife. She was asking for a
separation on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. The husband counterclaimed for divorce on the basis of the wife's alleged
adultery with the local undertaker. The husband, an engineer, had
tapped his home telephone. The wife spent much of the day in telephone conversations with friends, during which she said some compromising things. Under New York law, the telephone tapes were
admissible2 and the husband could call his wife to the stand.3 A trial
was bound to be nasty and posed risks for both sides. If the husband
prevailed on the grounds of adultery, the wife could not receive alimony.4 Yet a sympathetic trial court might be reluctant to leave her
without continued support and might thus rule against the husband.5

* Joseph E. Wargo Anoka County Bar Association Professor of Family Law, University of Minnesota Law School. B.S. 1954, Cornell University; J.D. 1958, New York University.
This Article is adapted from the 1992-93 Sidney and Walter Siben Distinguished Professorship Lecture, delivered by Professor Younger on April 14, 1993, at the Hofstra University
School of Law.

I. Dennis A. Ahlburg & Carol J. De Vita, New Realities of the American Family,
POPULATION BULL., Aug. 1992, at 2.
2. N.V. Simons' Metaalhandel v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 181 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (App.
Div. 1959) (per curiam).

3. See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 4502 (McKinney 1992) (commentary).
4. Under former § 236 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, a wife who was
guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify a divorce was not entitled to receive an alimony
award. This rle was eliminated in 1980. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236 (McKinney 1988); see
Brady v. Brady, 476 N.E.2d 290, 293 (N.Y. 1985).
5. See Brady, 476 N.E.2d at 293; Hessen v. Hessen, 308 N.E.2d 891, 894 (N.Y.

1974).
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The couple had three children and neither spouse wanted to continue
the marriage. The case cried out for settlement. The only obstacle
was the wife's lawyer. Her demands were impossible; she was intransigent and intractable. By the eve of trial, she and I had nothing but

harsh words and recriminations for each other. Then the Sibens appeared and immediately the atmosphere changed. Their intelligence
and professionalism enabled us to settle the case in a most satisfactory way for both parties. Indeed, the settlement was an unheralded
landmark. In exchange for a Mexican divorce, the husband agreed to
support the wife for five years so that she could complete her education and become economically independent. It was a very early exam-

ple of "rehabilitative alimony" 6-- an innovation in 1966; in 1993, a
standard practice.7

There have, of course, been many other dramatic changes in
divorce law in the last twenty-five years. "Alimony" is now euphemistically called "maintenance." 8 It has also become a two-way
street. 9 It now runs from ex-wives-like Joan Lunden, Roseanne
Barr, Jane Fonda, and Joan Collins 1 -to their ex-husbands, as well
as from ex-husbands to their ex-wives; fault is no longer a bar to
awarding it." We have also moved from fault-based divorce, a remedy provided exclusively to an innocent person whose spouse has been
guilty of a serious wrong, 2 to no-fault divorce, available for the asking to any spouse who views his or her marriage as a failure. 3
From property division according to title, we have come to equitable
distribution regardless of title. 4 Discretionary child support awards

6. See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMIY LAW 286 (2d ed. 1991).
7. Id.; Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes. 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 697-98 (1991).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(6) (McKinney 1988).
9. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking down Alabama statute authorizing the
imposition of alimony obligations on husbands in favor of wives but not on wives in favor
of husbands).
10. Alice Kahn, Reversal of Fortunes: When the Wife Pays It's About Time Women
Start Paying Alimony, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1992, at D3; Jane B. Quinn, Sauce for the
Goose, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1993, at 64.
11. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236A (McKinney 1988); see, e.g., Brady v. Brady, 476
N.E.2d 290, 293 (N.Y. 1985).
12. ELLMAN Er AL.., supra note 6, at 165.
13. I1&at 165-68; LAWRENCE M. FRiDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 179-186
(1st ed. 1973).
14. WALTER WADLINGTON, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 1108-09 (2d ed. 1990); compare Act
of Apr. 13, 1953, ch. 698, § 1164-a, 1953 N.Y. Laws 873 (transferred from the Civil Practice Act to the Domestic Relations Law by Act of Apr. 4, 1962, ch. 313, § 10, 1962 N.Y.
Laws 1197, as amended by Act of Apr. 23, 1963, ch. 685, § 5, 1963 N.Y. Laws 1103)
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have given way to awards based on statutory guidelines. 5 Preferences in custody disputes for mothers of young children are fast disappearing.' 6 The inquiry has become a gender-neutral search for the arrangement which comports with the child's best interests. 7
These changes in the law have been so dramatic that they are
frequently referred to as the "divorce revolution."'" To date, attempts
to measure the economic and social effects of the revolutionary
changes yield conflicting conclusions.' 9 The demographic picture,
however, is crystal clear. "[A] large proportion of divorced women,

especially those with young children, face very serious financial problems and a reduced standard of living.""°
If we add to this group of divorced mothers never-married single

mothers, the number of poor women and children grows larger. In
1991, "one in four babies was born to a mother who was not married."2' This group of never-married mothers is growing steadily but
it is still outnumbered by formerly married mothers. According to

1991 Census Bureau data, "[t]wo out of three single mothers today
are women who have been divorced, separated, abandoned by their

(permitting a court to make a direction as to the occupancy of realty only; all other questions raised as to title had to be decided in a separate cause of action) with N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 236B(5)(c)-(d) (McKinney 1988) (providing for equitable distribution of marital property regardless of the form in which title is held).
15. Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy, Award Variability and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 325-26 (1991).
16. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695 (Ala. 1981) (concluding "that the
tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of
sex"); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 75 (Alaska 1977) (concluding "that the doctrine of
tender years is not an appropriate criterion for determination of the best interests of the
child"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1048 (1978); Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1383 (D.C.
1978) (en bane) (directing that "in a dispute between a natural mother and father over custody of their child, the trial courts shall decide the delicate question of what is the child's best
interests solely by reference to the facts of the particular case without resort to the crutch of
a presumption in favor of either party").
17. ELLMAN El AL.. supra note 6, at 492. Some jurisdictions have replaced the tender
years presumption with a primary caretaker presumption. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278
S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981). Although facially neutral, this presumption frequently operates in favor of mothers. See, e.g., id.
18. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
19. See generally DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen D. Sugarman

&

Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).

20. Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction to DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 19, at 1, 4.
21. Tamar Lewin, Rise in Single Parenthood Is Reshaping U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1992, at A16.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1367

husbands or widowed."' It seems plain that marrying, divorcing, and
having children in or out of wedlock are dangerous activities for
women. In the process,
they risk poverty as well as the loss of finan3
independence.
cial
Teachers of family law spend an inordinate amount of time these
days assessing and reassessing the effects of the so-called "divorce
revolution" and talking about the so-called "problem" of poor divorced mothers. It has become a fashionable avocation and has
spawned a spate of books and articles suggesting more changes in
divorce law,24 though there is little agreement on what the changes
should be. Writings and speeches on divorced mothers have virtually
ignored the growing group of never-married mothers. And it may,
indeed, be improper to link them with their formerly married counterparts because their poverty seems to be more permanent. Statistics
show that forty percent of young unwed mothers end up as long-term
welfare recipients, compared to only fourteen percent of the formerly
married group.' Nevertheless, the two groups have common characteristics. They and their children are poorer than two-parent families,
and their family structure is under attack.26
Let me sound two warnings at the outset. First, calling the poverty of this group a "problem" implies that there is a solution, and
suggesting changes in the law to cure it implies that the solution is
legal. Neither may be the case. Second, focusing on the economic

22. Id.
23. See Carol Lawson, When Baby Makes 2: More Women Choose Single Motherhood,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at BI. Lawson refers to a recent Census Bureau report that found
the number of births to unmarried mothers who are white or college-educated more than
doubled in the last decade. Id. at B4. According to the Census Bureau, women with
bachelor's degrees account for 6.4% of unwed mothers. Id. Although these women may be
able to afford parenthood, their choice is not problem-free. Id.
24. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 7; Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits
of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
supra note 19, at 166; Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act-and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies. 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
43 (1991); J. Thomas Oldham, Putting Asunder in the 1990s, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1992)
(reviewing DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 19).
25. Lewin, supra note 21, at A16 (quoting Douglas J. Besharov, family-policy expert at
the American Enterprise Institute in Washington); see ELAINE C. KAMARCK & WILLIAM A.
GALSTON, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST., PUrrING CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY
POLICY FOR THE 1990S 11 (1990).
26. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, FINAL REPORT: BEYOND RHEORIC:
A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 3-37, 251 (1991) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT]; Endangered Family, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1993, at 17; Barbara D.
Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was Right, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47.
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hardships that divorce brings to mothers with young children ignores

several other facts. Divorce is not a completely happy event for anyone. It makes women poor 7 and men unhealthy, contributing to the
premature death of many men.' Divorce is not only economically
bad for children but damages them psychologically as well. 9 Divorce may, in fact, be psychologically good for some women. During
many of the twenty-five years in which divorce has rocketed and

women have poured into the labor force, female suicide rates have
fallen.' Perhaps women, free of unhappy marriages, working in jobs
outside their homes, are finding more joy in life.
First, I will identify the main themes in the academic debate
about divorced mothers, then I will expand the discussion to include

never-married mothers. I will then give you my own iconoclastic and,
you may think, outrageous opinions on how to discourage formation
of single-parent families. With some hesitation, I accept the view that
the two-parent family is better for children than the single-parent
family and make six recommendations: deconstitutionalizing the right
to marry; creating a special marital status for couples with minor
children; reforming the welfare system; repealing the Hyde Amend-

ment; including abortion in the basic benefits offered by any national
health plan; and, most importantly, launching a national advertising
campaign to teach women the dangers of having children in and out
of wedlock and how to protect themselves against the worst consequences of this seemingly immutable conduct. For in the end, the
academic debate misses the point: women must save themselves by
changing their own behavior; they cannot depend on divorce reform

27. See Sugarman, supra note 20, at 4.
28. See, e.g.. GERALD F. JACOBSON, THE MULTIPLE CRISES OF MARITAL SEPARATION
AND DIVORCE 67 (1983) (citing studies showing that divorced men are more likely to commit
suicide than married men); JAMES J. LYNCH, THE BROKEN HEART: THE MEDICAL CONSEQUENCES OF LONELINESS 38-68 (1979) (citing statistics showing incidence of every major
cause of death from two to six times higher in divorced men than in married men).
29. See, e.g., JUDrrH S. WALLERSTEiN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN & CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989); Divorce and Children: They Muck
You Up. ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1993, at 33; Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Breaking the Divorce
Cycle, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 48, 49; David Popenoe, The Controversial Truth: Two
Parent Families are Better, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1992, § 1, at 21.
30. See Till Death Them Do Part, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 64; see also John L.
McIntosh & Barbara L. Jewell, Sex Difference Trends in Completed Suicide, in SUICIDE &
LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 16, 22-23 (1986) (noting that female suicide rates declined
from 1971 to 1980 after increases during the period from the mid-1950s through 1971, and
reporting that the evidence is mixed about the effect of labor force participation on female
suicide).
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or other legal changes.
The academic debate on divorce swirls around four issues: (1)
the responsibility of no-fault divorce for the financial difficulties of
divorced women with children; (2) the place and theory of alimony in
a no-fault divorce system; (3) the proper balance between, on the one
hand, private ordering of the economic aspects of dissolving relationships, and, on the other hand, acceptance by society of responsibility
for the consequences; and (4) whether discretion and the resulting
possibility of achieving individualized justice is better than a system
of more rigid rules allowing for predictable results which may encourage out-of-court settlements.
It seems to me that divorced women with children have always
faced serious financial problems and a reduced standard of living, and
that the change from fault to no-fault grounds for divorce has little to
do with it." Because the divorce rate is higher, there are probably
more divorced mothers and children in financial straits now, and the
"problem" is, therefore, more acute. 2 The sad fact is that most divorcing couples have little property to divide, except, perhaps, the
family home which is often equally divided between the spouses or
awarded to the custodial parent.3 Child support and alimony, therefore, are all the courts have to work with. Before no-fault divorce,
my experience was that a combined alimony and child support award
rarely, if ever, exceeded fifty percent of the payor's earnings. Indeed,
the prevailing rule of thumb was closer to one-third. Obviously, a
former husband-one person living on half of a given sum-will be
better off economically than a former wife and the couple's three
children living on the same amount. No-fault divorce has not changed
the situation; combined awards yield similar results in this no-fault
era.' The most that can be said is that the switch from fault to nofault divorce deprived innocent, economically dependent spouses who
wanted to stay in their marriages of a valuable bargaining chip in
negotiating a financial settlement.
In the days of fault-based divorce, a husband who wanted to

31. See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results,
in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 19, at 75; Stephen D. Sugarman,
Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra
note 19, at 130. But see WErrzmAN, supra note 18, at xi.
32. Sugarman. supra note 20, at 3.
33. Garrison, supra note 7, at 665, 682-83, 728-29; Sugarman, supra note 31, at 130,
132.
34. Garrison, supra note 7, at 717-20.
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divorce his economically dependent, innocent wife could not do so
because he could not prove the requisite fault ground. Unless he got
the innocent spouse's cooperation in securing a foreign divorce or her
collusion in obtaining a fraudulent one based on fault, he would have
to stay in the marriage. Thus, he had an incentive to try to purchase
his spouse's cooperation or collusion by offering a better financial
settlement. Another aspect of the divorce revolution, equitable distribution, has given an advantage to the economically dependent spouse
who wants to leave rather than stay in the marriage. In the days
when title determined property division, such a spouse usually could
not afford a divorce because she had little or no earning power and
the assets were held in the earning spouse's name. Equitable distribution now empowers the economically dependent spouse to exit with a
share of the marital assets. So no-fault divorce and other attendant
reforms have been bad for some women but good for others. However, even if no-fault divorce is the real culprit responsible for the
economic plight of divorced mothers, no serious commentator considers a return to fault grounds either practicable or wise.
The second issue academics are arguing about is the place and
theory of alimony in a no-fault divorce system. Alimony, or "maintenance" as we now call it, is available to ex-husbands as well as to
ex-wives. 5 Nevertheless, it is claimed "almost exclusively by
wives."' In most cases, both before and after the divorce revolution,
alimony was not and is not awarded." It is doubtful that the number
or size of awards has decreased substantially despite the fact that so
many more women are in the work force. What has happened, at
worst, is that courts now favor short-term rehabilitative awards over
so-called permanent ones.39

35. See, e.g., R.I. GEi. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1993).
36. ELumAN ET AL., supra note 6. at 264.
37. Id.
38. Id.; Garrison, supra note 7, at 711-13; Garrison, supra note 31, passim.
39. See Garrison, supra note 7, at 739. Of course, permanent awards were, and still are,
subject to termination or modification on a showing of changed circumstances; short-term
rehabilitative awards are similarly subject to modification or early termination. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64(2)(a) (Vest 1993); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(9)(b)
(McKinney 1988). The only real difference between the two lies in which of the former
spouses has to initiate the modification or termination proceeding. If an obligor wants to
reduce or terminate a permanent award, he must make the first move; the payee, of course,
would have to move for an increase. Similarly, if the payee wants to increase or extend a
rehabilitative award, she must hire a lawyer and make the motion. To reduce or terminate a
rehabilitative award early, the obligor must take the initiative.
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Historically, the obligation to pay alimony was imposed on faulty
husbands because of the economic dependence of women. This was
sometimes viewed as punishment of the guilty husband, and under the
traditional American rule, only innocent wives were awarded alimony.' The utility of alimony in modem times, however, goes far beyond punishment. Ideally, the goal of any marital property regime,
whatever its details, is simple fairness. By fairness, I mean that when
properly applied to a divorcing couple, a regime should be capable of
achieving at least an approximation of equality of economic and
social result between the spouses. Under existing marital property
regimes, property division and alimony are the tools for accomplishing this. Few couples have any substantial property to divide." For
this reason, alimony is the only tool with which courts can attempt to
achieve equality of result and, thus, fairness between the spouses.
This view of alimony makes it completely consistent with a no-fault
system.
What is more, alimony should be available not on a single theory but on several, whichever best reflects the cause or causes of
inequality between the spouses in an individual case.4" Alimony
should be available to support a spouse in need, to provide a
homemaker's pension, to rehabilitate a spouse so that he or she can
become self-supporting, to reimburse a spouse for putting the other
through school, to compensate a spouse for loss of the marital standard of living and loss of earning capacity, and to compensate a
spouse for economic losses due to the other's conduct-for example,
dissipating or mismanaging marital assets. To restrict the courts to a
single theory of alimony would reduce the number of awards, thus
worsening rather than improving the lot of divorced mothers.
The third issue academics are arguing about is the proper balance
between private ordering of the economic aspects of dissolving relationships, on the one hand, and acceptance by society of responsibility for those consequences, on the other. The trend in recent years has
been toward private ordering.4 3 Couples are free to make their own

40. Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1989).
41. See Garrison, supra note 7, at 728-29; see also supra text accompanying note 33.
42. But see Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, A.L.I., ch. 5 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1992). The ALI project starts with the premise
that there must be a single theory of alimony: to compensate a spouse for financial loss
arising from dissolution of the marriage.
43. Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial Arrangements
Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 19, at 37;
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deals, opting out of marital property regimes by pre-nuptial and postnuptial agreements.' On a daily basis, judges divorce couples, and
accept and incorporate the couples' agreements into their divorce de-

crees. Judges do so without any inquiry into the effect of the divorce
on the minor children of the marriage and rubber-stamp couples'
custody arrangements. Divorced mothers and their children are not
doing so well under this regime and the government is not doing
much to help them. Even if government could afford to do more, it
may not be desirable for America to follow the lead of Sweden45
and for American mothers to substitute dependency on government

for dependency on the fathers of their children. As I said in another
speech not very long ago, families in Sweden are not exactly flourishing.' As in the United States, people marry less frequently' and
dissolve their relationships more frequently;" children are more often
raised by a single parent49 and families do fewer things together."
Swedish children are not as poor as American children because the
Swedish welfare state foots the bill, though recent welfare cuts make
it clear that the nation can no longer afford to do so."' Despite the

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 953-54 (1979); Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial
Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1988). For an argument against the trend
toward private ordering, see Krause, supra note 24, at 166; Deborah L. Rhode & Martha
Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce
Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 19, at 191.
44. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 950-56; see generally Younger, supra
note 43 (sorting the law of antenuptial agreements into an orderly framework for the guidance of those who draft, rely on, and enforce them).
45. See DAVID POPENOE, DISTURBING THE NEST: FAMILY CHANGE AND DECLINE IN
MODERN SOCIETIES 187-258 (Peter H. Rossi et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the decline of the
Swedish family as an institution); David Popenoe, Family Decline in the Swedish Welfare
State. 102 PUB. INTEREST 65 (1991) (arguing that Sweden's status as a welfare state has contributed to the decline of the Swedish family); see generally Kristina Orfali, The Rise and
Fall of the Swedish Model, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: RIDDLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES 417, 426-32 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds., Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
1991) (discussing Swedish family mores).
46. See Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American Family,
76 MINN. L. REv. 891, 895-96 (1992).
47. See Popenoe, supra note 45, at 66 (stating that Sweden has the lowest marriage rate
of any industrialized nation).
48. Id. at 75.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Roger Cohen, A Tighter Belt for Europe's Welfare States, N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 27,
1992, § 4, at 12; Eugene Robinson, Cuts Loom Over Sweden's Welfare State, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR TRIB., Dec. 27, 1992, at 18A; Sweden: Ask the Devil, ECONOMIST, Mar. 13, 1993, at
62.
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fact that Swedish families have been less poor than their American

counterparts, signs of trouble are apparent as juvenile delinquency is
up 2 and depression, alcoholism, and suicide are increasing.

3

Ac-

cordingly, a welfare state may be just as dangerous to families as a
market economy.
The fourth question academics are debating is the role of discretion versus fixed rules in resolving the economic consequences of
marital dissolution. At the moment we seem to be moving simultaneously in both directions.'" In the move toward fixed rules, all
states have adopted child support guidelines which operate as rebuttable presumptions in establishing levels of support.55 In Minnesota'
and Michigan,57 discretionary alimony has given or is about to give
way to awards which, like child support, are based on a guideline
calculation. Statutes in Arizona,58 California,59 Colorado,' and Illi-

nois 6' have replaced discretionary decisions with automatic stays of
certain typical pre-divorce conduct by the parties. These go into effect
on service of a summons and petition for divorce. On the side of
expanded discretion is the experimental type of program initiated in
California by Justice Donald B. King,62 now being tried in Minnesota.63 Variously called "case management" or "collaborative law," it
gives the presiding judge such extensive case management powers to
get the parties to a settlement that some critics say it ignores due
process." On this side, as well, is the demise of the tender years

52. Popenoe, supra note 45, at 76.
53. Id.
54. See Carl E. Schneider, The Tension Between Rules and Discretion in Family Law: A
Report and Reflection, 27 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1993).
55. See Marianne Takas, Improving Child Support Guidelines: Can Simple Formulas
Address Complex Families?, 26 FAM. L.Q. 171, 174 (1992).
56. See, e.g., Lorraine S. Clugg, MSBA's Spousal Maintenance Committee Tries to Make
Sense of Maintenance, FAM. L.F., Winter/Spring 1993, at 6 (reporting that the Minnesota
State Bar Association formed a Spousal Maintenance Guidelines Committee in June of 1991,
which has been meeting regularly since then).
57. Id. at 7.
58. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-315(A) (1991).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4359(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1993).
60. Coro. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-107(4)(b) (West 1987).
61. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, 1 501.1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (original version at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40,
501.1 (1991)); see Jeff Atkinson, Automatic Stays Bring New Balance to Divorce Actions, A.B.A. J., April 1993, at 98.
62. J. Donald B. King, Save the Court-Save the Family, FAM. L.F., Winter/Spring
1993, at 1. 2.
63. A Gentler, Kinder Divorce, MINNEAPOLtS STAR TRIB., Dec. 28, 1992, at 8A.
64. See Carol Cronin, Case Management: Panacea for the Future or Another California
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presumption,' which gave preference in custody disputes to mothers
of young children. Given a choice between arguing to the court's discretion and asking it to apply a fixed rule, I would much prefer the
discretionary approach. As a practical matter, however, it makes little
difference which direction the law takes. Empirical studies show a
remarkable consistency between discretionary decisions and those
based on fixed rules.6
Of course, none of these issues affects never-married mothers.

No-fault divorce, alimony, and fixed rules for resolving the economic
and other consequences of marital dissolution versus discretion are all
non-issues for them. So is the proper balance between private ordering and public responsibility since so many of these mothers are
already publicly supported. As a group they are especially vulnerable
to welfare dependency; they stay on welfare longer than other welfare

recipients and tend to pass the dependency from one generation to the
next. 67
The crucial question is what, if anything, we can and should do

about this ever-expanding group of single mother families. The answer, of course, depends on what we think of
admit my own confusion. I do not know what to
these families are bad for children and society?
explanation for increased reports of child abuse

them. Here, I must
think. Is it true that
Are they really the
and neglect," drops

Disaster?, 5 FAM. L.F., Winter/Spring 1993, at 5; see also Nancy Z. Berg, Collaborative Law
Can Abandon Clients, 5 FAM. L.F., Winter/Spring 1993, at 2, 3 (letter to the editor) (providing an advocate's view of the inherently coercive effect of the practice of collaborative
law).
65. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
66. A study of New York, for example, shows that the shift from property division
according to fixed rules, namely title, to discretionary equitable distribution, did not change
property division. Garrison, supra note 7, at 670-71. Another study on child support in Colorado, Hawaii, and Illinois reports that the shift from discretionary child support awards to
awards according to guidelines brought only "modest" change because many families have
such low income that the courts could make only very low awards; because most decisions
are reached voluntarily by the parties who tend to underestimate the required level of support
and courts rubber-stamp them; and because pre-existing yardsticks were incorporated into the
child support guidelines and formulae adopted. Thoennes et al., supra note 15, at 345. Similarly, a California study shows that the demise of the tender years doctrine-the rebuttable
presumption that custody of young children should go to their mother-in favor of a wider
ranging discretionary search for the best interests of the child, has not changed the fact that
mothers remain the primary custodians of children following divorce. Mnookin et al., supra
note 43, at 71-72.
67. See Douglas J. Besharov, Beyond Murphy Brown; We're Ignoring the Fact that All
Single Mothers Aren't Alike, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1992, at C3, C3 (stating that "children
of never-married mothers are three times more likely to be on welfare than are children of
divorced mothers").
68. Peter Steinfels, Seen, Heard, Even Worried About, N.Y. TMEs, Dec. 27, 1992, § 4,
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in Scholastic Aptitude Test ("SAT') scores,' increases in juvenile
and other crime,7 ° and increased teenage suicide and homicide
rates? 7' Or is family structure insignificant in explaining these societal ills? Do all family structures work roughly as well given equal
economic advantage? And should we, instead of criticizing single
mothers, applaud them for their courage? It depends on whether we
heed Daniel Patrick Moynihan and his supporters or Murphy Brown
and hers. Moynihan argues that we have redefined both divorce and
out-of-wedlock birth as normal instead of deviant:
[T]he amount of deviant behavior in American society has increased
beyond the levels the community can 'afford to recognize' and...
accordingly, we have been re-defining deviancy so as to exempt
much conduct previously stigmatized, and also quietly raising the
'normal' level in categories where behavior is now abnormal by any
earlier standard.'
Is this what otherwise intelligent people are doing when they
bad-mouth the two-parent family and call for recognition of divorce
as a "normal social occurrence,"73 a "necessary and appropriate corrective for an unwise or undesired marital choice,"' a "constructive," 5 "positive, helpful"'76 process? Is the American public merely
registering disapproval of Dan QuayleP or is it "defining deviancy
down" when it makes Murphy Brown's single motherhood into an
extraordinary ratings success? A recent article in the Atlantic described the public's response:
On the night Murphy Brown became an unwed mother, 34
million Americans tuned in, and CBS posted a 35 percent share of
the audience. The show did not stir significant protest at the grass

at 1.
69. Id. But see Karen DeWitt, College Board Scores Are Up For Second Consecutive
Year, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 19, 1993, at Al (noting that average SAT scores have risen for two
years in a row).
70. Steinfels, supra note 68, at 1.
71. Id.
72. Daniel P. Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17, 19 (1993).
73. Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIvORCE
REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 19, at 6, 28.
74. Il at 29.
75. GLENDA RILEY, DIvoRCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 185 (1991).
76. Id.
77. See Dan Quayle's Fictitious World, N.Y. TIMEs, May 22, 1992, at A20; Andrew
Rosenthal, After the Riots; Quayle Says Riots Sprang From Lack of Family Values, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 1992, at Al.
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roots and lost none of its advertisers. The actress Candice Bergen
subsequently appeared on the cover of nearly every women's and
news magazine in the country and received an honorary degree at
the University of Pennsylvania as well as an Emmy award. The
show's creator, Diane English, popped up in Hanes stocking ads.78
What I am asking, in other words, is how shall we label the rise
in single mother families? Is it "deviant" and, therefore, a legitimate
cause for moral panic, or is it "normal," a logical, inevitable development in a society that values, indeed constitutionalizes, adult choice,
freedom, and happiness in family matters? If I had to choose a position, I would fall back on my own experience, which is admittedly
limited. It teaches me that raising children is an exceptionally difficult
task and that even a loving, stable, two-parent, two-income family
faces a high risk of failure. The task must be much harder for, and
therefore less likely to be accomplished in, a family in which there is
only a single parent and a single income.
Having edged gingerly over to the side of deviance and moral
panic, the next question is what should and can be done about it?
Certainly law reform is not the only or even the best answer. All we
can ask of the law is that it not abandon its venerable role as teacher.
No teacher can guarantee that students will pay attention to the lessons it attempts to impart, but every teacher has the obligation to try
to impart the right lessons. To that end, it seems we can properly
reform the law to correct the wrong lessons it now proclaims. The
law now teaches us that the right to marry is fundamental and constitutional.79 The implication is that marriage is an activity that is suitable for everyone and essential for a happy life. Thus people marry
cavalierly, and, of course, one out of two of their marriages eventually ends in divorce." Furthermore, because marriage is now characterized as a fundamental constitutional right, the states cannot freely
regulate it."
We should reform the law to deconstitutionalize the right to
marry,' thus eliminating the unwanted implications that it is suitable

78. Whitehead, supra note 26, at 55.
79. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhafl, 434 U.S. 374, 383
(1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
80. RLEY, supra note 75, at 5.
81. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
82. See generally Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry: A
Dissenting View, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 949 (1992) (arguing that a close analysis reveals
substantial difficulties with the concept of a right to marry).
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for everyone and is required for happiness. This would free the states
to experiment with programs that encourage and, perhaps, permit only
the most responsible to marry and discourage and, perhaps, prevent
the rest from doing so. Second, the law now tells parents that their
personal satisfactions are more important than their children's welfare.
It thus permits parents to divorce without any inquiry into the likely
effects of the divorce on minor children of the marriage. Yet we
know very well that divorce is both psychologically and economically
damaging to children.83 We should reform the law to create a special
marital status for couples with children: the marriage for the benefit
of minor children. It should be harder to enter and carry more onerous economic incidents than other marriages. Divorce from it during
the children's minority should be granted only after a finding that it
would be better for the minor children than continuing the marriage.
Third, the welfare system now encourages female recipients not to
marry the fathers of their children," gives them more benefits as
they have more babies, 5 seems unconcerned with their failure to
stay in school, and penalizes them for earnings and savings.' 6 It thus
fosters the very behavior it should be trying to discourage. We should
reform it to encourage recipients to marry their children's fathers, to
delay having additional children until they are able to support them,
to finish school, and to earn and save. A number of states are already
experimenting with such programs." Fourth, the Hyde Amendment
now makes federal funds unavailable for most abortions.8 9 Its net
effect has been to encourage states to cease to fund them. The lesson
this teaches is that, although theoretically all women have a constitutional right to make reproductive decisions, only the wealthy can
effectively exercise it. We should reform the law by repealing the

83. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
84. See American Survey: The Carrots and Stick of Welfare Reform, ECONOMIST, Mar.
13, 1993, at 31; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 91-92 (quantifying the
economic barriers to marriage among welfare recipients).
85. See American Survey: The Carrots and Stick of Welfare Reform, supra note 84, at
31-32.
86. Id. at 31.
87. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Clinton Idea Used to Limit Welfare: States Issue Their
Own Plans to Put Two Year Curbs on Those Getting Benefits, N.Y. TiMES, June 2, 1993, at
A7; Jason DeParle, Counter to Trend, a Welfare Program in California Has One Idea: Get a
Job!, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 1993, § 1. at 12; Jason DeParle, Ohio Welfare Bonuses Keep
Teen-Age Mothers in School, N.Y. TmES, Apr. 12, 1993, at A7.
88. Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. (93 Stat.)
923, 926.
89. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980).
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Hyde Amendment, thus encouraging the states to restore funding for
abortions without restrictions. In the same vein, we should include
abortion services in the basic benefits package offered by whatever
national health plan emerges from Congress.
I certainly would support any and all of these reforms in the
law, but I would be careful not to overemphasize their likely effects
on human behavior. We have to accept two facts. First, despite the
law, whatever it says, and the availability of alternative choices,
women are going to continue to engage in the same old conduct-they will marry, divorce, have children in or out of wedlock,
and become their children's custodians. This conduct may be immutable-conduct which women not only passionately want to engage in
but also have to engage in because of built-in female biological traits.
Some will disagree, saying that this conduct is not immutably female
but rather the result of societal pressure and conditioning. I reject this
view on the basis, in part, of the Kibbutz experiment in Israel.'
During the Kibbutz experiment, traditional female roles were assigned
to hired professionals; in the end, however, women themselves insisted on recapturing their traditional roles as mothers, cooks, and laundresses." The second fact we must accept is that marrying, divorcing, and having children in and out of wedlock is extremely risky for
women. As a society we have an obligation to make that clear. Instead of romanticizing marriage and motherhood we ought to portray
it as it is. Marriage is very likely to end in divorce. Having children
in or out of wedlock is likely to make women and their children
poor. What is more, as Shulamith Firestone so vividly told us in The
Dialectic of Sex,9" labor is boring, childbirth hurts, and the prod-

90. See LIONEL TIGER & JOSEPH SHEPHER, WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ 26-33 (1975); see
also Christine Gorman, Sizing Up the Sexes, TIME, Jan. 20, 1992, at 42.
It is one thing to recognize that there are biological differences between men and
women: the androgen-estrogen phenomenon. See Gorman, supra, at 44. It is quite another to
say that human behavior is divided into two categories-female and male-and that the law
ought to recognize this and respond to it by treating the sexes differently. This is called
"difference feminism.' See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONsTmmrIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR
THE CONSTITuTION'S THIRD CENTURY 343-44 (1993). In my opinion, "difference feminism" is
dangerous and demeaning to women because it revives the old stereotypes that equality feminists have worked so hard to abolish and exalts so-called female characteristics by labeling
them "good" instead of "bad.' See Katha Pollitt, Are Women Morally Superior to Men?. THE
NATION, Dec. 28, 1992, at 799, 806. Any female who fails to exhibit them, therefore, will
be deficient. The best environment for women and men is equality before the law so that all
are free to choose how to live and conduct themselves.

91. TIGER & SHEPHER, supra note 90, at 262-63.
92. SHULAMrIH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECIc OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST REvOLU-
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uct-a baby all your own to muck up as you please--can be, but
frequently is not, very rewarding.93 Women, therefore, should not
engage in this conduct without an awareness of the risks. Making
them aware should become a concerted national effort. It would require a dramatic change in current individual and societal attitudes.
Thus it is a job for the mass media, not the law. We need a national
advertising campaign-the kind that taught the American people to
smoke cigarettes, then to stop smoking them; the kind that presently
sells them billions of dollars of questionable products like soft drinks,
deodorants, and frankfurters.
I am not alone in calling for a radical change in the way we
look at marriage, divorce, and having children. Other commentators
are beginning to recognize this need. As Barbara Dafoe Whitehead
put it in her recent piece in The Atlantic Monthly:
At least as important as changes in the law and public policy are
efforts to change the cultural climate, particularly the media's messages about divorce and non-marital childbirth .... It would...
be valuable to enlist the support of leaders in the entertainment
industry-particularly sports and movie stars-in conveying to children that making babies out of wedlock is as stupid as doing drugs
or dropping out of school. This might, of course, await more exemplary behavior by some of those stars."
Similarly, Peter Steinfels, writing for The New York Times, in a
recent article about children, recognizes the importance of cultural
forces. He says:
The most subtle sacrifices may be those facing the culturemakers themselves, a generation of political leaders, media executives, scholars, movie-makers, musicians, novelists, journalists, advertising creators and purchasers, critics and social commentators.
For them the challenges to authority of the 1960's given legitimacy
and perpetuated in causes like racial justice, human rights and feminism remain formative.
Their own experiences of marriage and family may now have
taught them lessons about the importance of social norms and the
absurdities of endless quests for self-realization ....
The idea that a serious national campaign for child well-being
might demand self-discipline and restraint raises quandries about

"ION (1970).

93. Id. at 81.
94. Whitehead, supra note 26, at 71.
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creative freedom-and painful challenges to the self-image of many
who produce or influence mass culture.95
No matter how hard or painful it may be for the culture-creators
to tell the truth about marriage, divorce, and having children, it must
be done. Women are entitled to the right message and a better chance
to protect themselves from the worst consequences of dangerous conduct. If women will not or cannot change their basic behavior, with a
revised message they will at least learn that it puts them at risk.
Increasing experience of financial independence-women have poured
into the labor force in the last twenty-five years-will enable them
to protect themselves from the worst consequences of their conduct.
They can negotiate antenuptial and cohabitation agreements; keep
their assets separate during relationships; use Norplant, a simple to
administer, more-or-less foolproof, inexpensive contraceptive;97 and,
above all, attempt to retain the ability to support themselves regardless of their living arrangements or children.
It is increasingly clear that women can no longer afford to swallow unquestioningly the current popular mythology about marriage,
divorce, and children. Nor can they depend on men, the government,
oi academics' divorce reform proposals to save them from the consequences of their conduct. Women, armed with the facts and an increasing degree of economic savoir faire and independence, will have
to take precautions to minimize the damage to themselves from their
acts. May all women have the resilience and determination of
Chaucer's Wife of Bath. She survived five husbands, and still wore
red.98 Of course, she never had children. Remember her answer to
the age old question, "[w]hat is the thing that women most desire?"" It was "dominion"-dominion over their husbands, and
their lovers. I would add "and, above all, dominion over themselves!"

95. Steinfels, supra note 68, at 12.
96. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 21-22.
97. See Deborah Franklin, The Birth Control Bind, HEALTH, July 1992, at 42.
98. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Prologue, in THE CANTERBURY TALES 21, 34 (Nevill
Coghill trans., Penguin Books 1951).
99. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, The Wife of Bath's Tale, in THE CANTERBURY TALES, supra
note 98, at 239-40.
100. Id. at 244.
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